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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Appellant in this matter has always taken the position
that the clearly erroneous standard applied in this case.
Respondent attempts to create an issue where none exists. A
careful review of both the reply brief and Appellant's initial
brief shows that the position taken by Appellant is correct.
This Court must review the written findings of fact and
conclusions of law to determine that the factors that should have
been taken into account of the Trial Court were taken into
account and that they were properly applied by the Trial Court
Judge.

Appellant's contention is that they were not.

The amendment to Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure does not obviate the need for adequate findings of fact
in a custody situation.

In this case, the Court simply did not

bridge the gap between testimony and findings.

The Court gives

no indication as to what facts it took into account in making its
determination.

In fact, in Appellant's situation, the Court

specifically failed to take into account factors subsequent to
Appellant's return to the State of Arizona where such factors
were taken into account as to Respondent.

Ultimately, of course,

the Trial Court has the obligation in its findings to show not
only its ultimate conclusion, but also to show that the
conclusion is justified.

The Trial Court simply failed to make

such a determination and Appellant has clearly addressed that in
her initial Brief and in this Reply Brief.

ARGUMENT
I
THE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS STANDARD OF RULE 52(a) IS
AND HAS BEEN THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN DOMESTIC CASES.
Clearly the Trial Court is the place to adjudicate domestic
matters.

This is "because the proper adjudication of custody

matters 'is highly dependent upon personal equations which the
Trial Court is an advantaged position to appraisef", Smith v.
Smith, 726 P.2d 423,425 (Utah 1986) citing Johnson v. Johnson,
323 P.2d 16, 19 (Utah 1958).

The Utah Supreme Court and

Appellate Courts have indicated that they will not overturn a
Trial Court's determinations in a custody matter or in any other
domestic matter unless the appellant can show a misapplication of
the facts of that the Trial Court misapplied principals of law,
Smith, 1986 supra and Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Appellate Court must determine not only that the
Findings support the Conclusion, but also demonstrate why and how
that conclusion was reached, Smith, supra, see also Ebbert v.
Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1987) (regarding findings of
fact, conclusions of law and visitation issues) and Smith v.
Smith, 751 P.2d 1149 (Utah App. 1988) (the application of
findings of fact and conclusions of law and the distribution of
property) both decided after amended Rule 52(a) went into effect.
The Court must review the written Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law to determine that the factors that should be
taken into account by the Trial Court Judge were (1) in fact
2

taken into account by the Judge and (2) properly applied by the
Trial Court Judge.
Unless it is clearly erroneous the Trial Court's
interpretation of the facts must be allowed, Berger v. Berger,
713 P.2d 695 (Utah 1985).

However, this Court still must examine

the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to determine if they
logically follow from the Court's determination of the facts, see
also Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123 (Utah App. 1987), Gardner v.
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988) and Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d
647 (Utah 1988).

3

II
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO MAKE ADEQUATE
FINDINGS OF FACT IS NOT OBVIATED BY
AMENDED RULE 52(a).
In its initial brief, the Appellant sets forth the facts
considered in the Court's weighing of the actions and testimony.
To sum up, the Court found numerous items in its review of
custody factors subsequent to the couple's return to Arizona.
However, the Court failed to make any findings regarding the
ability or inability of the Appellant to meet the same test
applied to the Respondent.

The Court simply failed to make any

findings in this regard after Appellant's return to Utah and
subsequent to the Court's award of temporary custody.
Respondent states that the Court entered into a detailed
analysis of all factors to be determined in an award of custody.
While the Court did in fact walk through those factors as to the
Respondent subsequent to his return to Arizona, it did not do the
same as to the Appellant.

The Court did make a detailed analysis

of Appellant's conduct in Arizona but made no findings as to her
conduct after she returned to the State of Utah.

This is even

subsequent to the Court's award of the temporary custody of two
of the minor children to the Appellant.
The Respondent goes through a detailed analysis of what
evidence the Court could have used and might have used in
arriving at some of the conclusions.

The missing ingredient

here, however, is that the Court noting the findings that the
4

Respondent claims could be drawn from the testimony he outlines
in his brief.

It is unfortunate that the Court did not make as

detailed an analysis of the evidence presented by the Respondent
as the Respondent does in his Brief.

The Respondent also gives a

detailed review of the findings of the custody evaluator.

This

is quite interesting in light of the fact that the Court makes no
mention of the custody evaluation in its findings of fact.
Court simply ignored the custody evaluation.

The

In even further

error, the Respondent refers to the testimony of Rebecca Semken
in giving an opinion of the custody evaluation as borne out on
page 178 of the Trial Transcript (RA 278).
"Q: All right, did you formulate an opinion with
respect to the minor child Lance as to the opinion of
Mrs. Scartezini as outlined in the home study."
ff

A:

I basically agreed."

Whereupon Appellant's attorney objected to the testimony in that
Mrs. Semken had failed to speak with all parties involved and the
Trial Court overruled the objection.

The legal issues concerning

this decision are more clearly set forth in Section II of
Appellant's original Brief on page 15.
The Respondent goes through this testimony of Rebecca Semken
and calls the Court's conclusions findings of fact; however,
there are no such conclusions included in the Court's findings of
fact.

What is missing is the bridge between the testimony and

the conclusions.

The Findings of Fact are suppose to create that

bridge; however, the Court's findings do not indicate what
evidence was relied upon.
5

The Respondent in his Brief takes us through the factors
that the Court supposedly addressed in making a determination of
custody.

Respondent also takes us through all of the evidence

that supposedly supports the Court's conclusions; however, the
only findings of fact that were made in this case are the
findings and conclusions that are set forth by the Respondent in
his Brief.

There is absolutely no connection between the

testimony and the Court's findings.

Even a cursory review the

Court's findings would reveal this.
The Appellant doesn't really dispute the factors that were
set forth by Respondent in his Brief; however, the findings of
fact issued by the Court in any of its statements are simply not
supportive of the factors Respondent uses.
It is also somewhat ironic that Respondent relies heavily
upon the custody evaluation performed by Mrs. Scartezini and the
evaluation of the evaluation by Ms. Semken, but nowhere does the
Court refer to the custody evaluation in its findings.
Appellant asserts that the failure of the Trial Court to
take into account the care received by the two children in her
custody and her ability to care for them during the time period
in question is a clear abuse of discretion.

Obviously, if the

Trial Court had determined that the children were not properly
cared for, well adjusted or for some other reason were not
appropriately cared for by the Appellant during this time period,
it would be within the Trial Court's discretion to make said
determination based upon suitable Findings of Fact and
6

Conclusions of Law.

However, the Court simply ignored this and

made no mention of these two children, either in its Memorandum
Decision or its Findings of Fact.

To fail to make a decision and

then simply transfer custody based on the care received by the
other two children is an abuse of discretion and shows no
reliance upon the evidence presented.
In its Findings, in paragraphs 4 and 6, the Court apparently
relies on certain factors to make a determination of custody.
The Court reiterated Respondent's testimony regarding the
Appellant's activities in Arizona.

However, there was no showing

that the instability the Court was concerned about continued
after December of 1986 when the Appellant was awarded temporary
custody of the two younger children.

There was no testimony

presented regarding lack of supervision or limited supervision of
these two children.

Rather, the Court sets forth the activities

in Arizona as an example of the Appellant's previous poor
judgment, but sets forth no Findings as to any continued poor
judgment or lack of care of the minor children.

The Court does

indicate that the Appellant "moved in with and began to live with
another man and that she continues to this time to live with him
with said two children and does so openly."

(Findings of Fact,

paragraph 4).
It would seem that, even though the Court does not set forth
the reasons in its Findings, that Appellant's relationship with
this individual is a substantial basis for the Court's failure to
continue the existing custodial relationship.
7

The Respondent

also challenges the Appellant's position that the Court
improperly took into account the sexual relationship between the
Appellant and her now husband, Mr. Michael Stice.

The Courts

have been clear that whether its a change of custody or an award
of custody, the best interests of the children are to be taken
into account.

See Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 52 (Utah 1982).

The

only distinction between the two is that for a change of custody,
the Hogge rule reguires a substantial change in circumstances.
The best interest test remains the same.

In Sanderson v. Tyron,

739 P.2d 623, 625 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court determined
that "an extra marital sexual relationship is insufficient to
justify a change in custody.11

In this case, the Court goes so

far as to rule that a polygamist relationship alone is not a
sufficient basis to take custody from the individual living in
the polygamist relationship.

The Court determined that an

individual sexual relationship, absent some showing of adverse
effect upon the children, was not sufficient as a factor for an
award of custody.

This position is further supported in case law

in Fontenot v. Fontenot, 714 P.2d 1131 (Utah 1986); Shioji v.
Shioji, 712 P.2d 197 (Utah 1985) and Stuber v. Stuber, 244 P.2d
650 (Utah 1952) .
The Courts have determined that, in this day and age of premarital relationships, unless an adverse effect can be shown upon
the children, the Court will not take the mere fact of a
relationship outside the bounds of marriage as grounds for an
award of custody.

In that the Trial Court found no adverse
8

impact, it improperly considered the existence of a relationship
between Mrs. Erwin and Mr. Stice.
The Trial Court has the obligation in its findings not only
to indicate its ultimate conclusion, but also must "show why the
ultimate conclusion it reaches is justified", Smith (1986),
supra, citing Milne Truck Lines v. Public Service Commission, 636
P.2d 1047 (Utah 1981); Elwel v. Board of Education, 626 P.2d 460
(Utah 1981).

In custody determinations, these findings are

critical in that "proper findings of fact ensure that the
ultimate custody award follows logically from and is supported by
the evidence and the controlling legal principals," Painter v.
Painter, 80 UAR 14 at 15 (Utah App. 1988) citing Smith v. Smith,
726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986).

Therefore, it is not necessary,

or it should not be necessary, for an Appellate Court to try and
guess the basis for the Trial Court's Findings of Fact.

In this

situation, there are no Findings of Fact in regard to the ability
or lack thereof of the Appellant to care for the children.

In

making such a determination, the Court should look to "the
particular needs of the child and the ability of each parent to
meet those needs," Martinez v. Martinez, 728 P.2d 996 (Utah
1986), citing Smith, supra and Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P.2d
38 (Utah 1983) and that was not done in this case.

9

Ill
CONCLUSION
The Appellant seeks relief from the Trial Court's decision
in this matter.

In all issues presented, the Appellant seeks

reversal of the Trial Court's decision with remand for further
hearing with instructions from the Appellate Court regarding the
issues presented.
Regarding custody, the Trial Court gave no indication in its
Findings of Fact as to how its Conclusions were reached.

It

appears that substantial testimony was not discounted or found to
be not credible, but rather was plainly ignored.

This

constitutes an abuse of discretion in the decision made by the
Trial Court.

In addition, this case requires remand for the

Court to issue proper Findings of Fact in regard to the custody
determination.
As can be seen, there are numerous issues in this case that
need to be resolved.

The Appellant requests that the Appellate

Court reverse the issues presented and remand the case back to
the Trial Court with specific instructions regarding the
necessary Findings for custody.
Respectfully Submitted this

/

1988.
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